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•• 
~ -:r sc; 2 June 1959 
1. w. W. Winslow, the owner of Wins~ow•s Antique Car Co., hired Bill Stover to wash 
and polish the automobiles which were for sale on his lot. Stover was well educated 
but onlymi~dlyinterested in working. The company dealt only in older model auto-
mobiles and on the windshield of each was written in chalk its price and the 
additional words 11 No Warranties." As a means of publicizing the business, all of 
Winslow's salesmen wore colorful clothing of the 1920's period, including white 
flannel trousers, colorful vests, blazers, straw boaters and the like. 
Tom Travers came on the lot one Saturday and became interested in a 1932 Ford 
which Stover, in rubber coveralls and boots, was washing. Seeing Travers' ' interest 
and feeling an impulse to try out his selling ability, Stover began to extol the 
merits of the vehicle to Travers, but sensing that .Travers' enthusiasm was waning, 
Stover impulsively told Travers that he was authorized to give Travers a five-year 
warranty of performance on the car. This promise convinced Travers to buy the car, 
and he paid Stover the purchase price in cash, for which Stover gave him the usual 
bill of sale at the bottom of which he added in pen the five-year warranty and 
signed the paper as agent of Winslow's Antique Car Company. 
As Travers began to turn the starter crank of the car, Stover went into the 
company's office, turned over the money to Winslow and related the entire transactio! 
to him, including the addition of the warranty, and the two of them watched through 1 
the window as Travers finally started the car and drove away. Winslow inunediately 
fired Stover. ·· · · · 
The following week the 1932 Ford broke down b~yond repair and Travers made demand 
on -W. w. Winslow to recover for breach of the f1ve-year warranty • 
1rJinslo111 asks your advice as to whether 11 _ i s responsible to Tr avers. ;Hm• ··:ould ;y ou 
advise him? . . 1 • • (AGENCY) Winslow is responsible to Traver~ for ~e ra~1f1ed Stover s or1g1nally un-
authorized acts when he accepted the cons1derat1on g1ven by Travers with full know-
ledge of the facts and made no attempt to return it. 
2 December 1959. 
1. Mason, a wholesale dealer, employed Nelson to take orders for the sale and de-
livery of t.v.sets. Because Mason feared that he might offend his retail dealers 
if it became known that he vas selling directly to individual purchasers he in-
structed Nelson to take the contracts in his own name and not to mention
1
Mason's 
name in any way. N~lson, acting on these instructions, made a sale to Overly and 
took in payment Overly's non-negotiable note due in sixty days for $750. Nelson 
owed Parke a past due note for $750 which Parke considered of doubttul value and 
sold to Overly for $500. When Overly's note matured, he tendered Nelson this note 
in discharge of Overly's own note. He then learned for the first time that Mason 
was the real party in interest, and he now consults you as to his right to offset 
Nelson's note against his own note, now held by Mason. How ought you to advise him? 
(AGEUJY)He has a right to use the offset "If a third party, in contracting with the 
agent, did not know of the agency, and the circumstances were such that he ought 
not to be charged with knowledge of it, he is entitled, when sued by the principal, 
to be placed in the same position as if the agent had been the real party in in-
terest, and hence to assert any setoff he may have against such agent." Burks 
Pleading and Practice(4th Ed)#6B. 
'JG tJ 2> June 1960. 
1. Abel Baker, a resident of New York City, is desirous of removing his garment 
fac~ory from a location in New York City to a location in Virginia where he will 
have more room to expand his facilities at less cost. He employs Charlie Davis, a 
realtor in the City of Richmond, to purchase a suitable manufacturing site for him 
4'f( • 
:i.n or near Richmond. Davis owns a plant site of ten acres in Chesterfield County 
v1hlph is suitable and he sells this plant site to Baker for $50.,000 cash. Davis 
informs Baker of all the relevant facts about the plant site, except he does not tell 
Baker that he had purchased this same plant site for $30.,000 eight months previously. 
After the sale is completed Baker learns from a competitor of Davis that Davis had 
paid only $30,000 for the property eight months before. 
Baker consults you as an attorney as to what rights~ if any; he has against Davis. 
W1at would you advise? 
(AGENCY) Baker has a right to recover $20,000 from Davis who was acting in a 
fiduciary capacity. He thus owed a duty to inform Baker of all relevant facts ~hether 
asked about them or not. The fact that he had paid only $30.,000 for the site only a 
few months ago was a material fact. 
)>6 1> - · 2 December 1960 
1. Trout is a dealer in antique furniture who resides in Chesterfield County. 
Atwood, knowing that Trout had a rare Chippendale desk and believing he was acting 
for his friend Paul Post, went to Trout's place of business and stated, "I am here 
at the request of Paul Post to purchase for him your Chippendale desk, and I am 
authorized to say that he is willing to pay you the listed purchase price of $1.,600 
within 10 days after delivery." To this Trout replied, 11 The sale is made.n Later 
in the day when Atwood told Post of the transaction, Post said, 11 You had no author-
ity to buy that desk for me, but as I would very much like to have it, I approve 
what you have done. Here is my check for $1,600. Please give it to Trout and see 
that he delivers the desk to me tomorrow." The next afternoon, Atwood went to 
Trout's place of business, tendered Post's check, and asked that Trout promptly de-
liver the desk to Post. Trout then informed Atwood that he would not deliver the 
desk to P~st as he had sold and delivered the desk to Stevens one hour before at 
a price of $1,800. Post now consults you and asks what rights, if any, he may have 
against Trout. What should you advise him? 
(AGENCY) Post has an action against Trout for breach of contract. Post ratified the 
contract made by Atwood before Trout sold the desk to Stevens. This ratification 
related back and was equivalent to prior authority. Trout has no equity as he sold 
the desk aftar he knew that he had contracted for its sale to Post, and without 
even making inquiry. The damages would be at least $200 as the title to the specific 
desk passed to Post when he ratified. See #88 Restatement of Agency. Note: Post 
cannot recover the desk from Stevens as Post had left the article which formerly 
belonged to the dealer with the dealer in that type of property thereby giving 
that dealer the power to pass a good title to a bona fide purchaser for value. 
2 June 1961. 
l~~he Ace Taxi Co~,Inc., employs no drivers but merely receives orders from pro-
spective passengers and puts 11 Ace Taxi Co. Inc." on cabs owned and opera ted by inde-
pendent drivers. One of these drivers, while operating one of the cabs negligently 
collided with another automobile, injuring one of the cab passengers who reasonabl~ 
believes the Ace Taxi Co.,Inc., to be the employer. The injured passenger and the 
owner of the other automobile each sues Ace Taxi Co.Inc., to recover. 
(1) May the passenger recover? (2)May the owner of the other automobile recover? 
(AGENCY)(l)Passenger may recover. Ace Taxi Co. is estopped to claim that the driver 
was not its servant since it has held itself out as the employer, and passenger has 
relied on such holding out. . 
(2)The owner of the other car, cannot recov~ as he ~id not rely on Ace Taxi Co's. 
supposed ownership and operat~on of the car ~n quest1on. Hence one of the requisites 
of an estoppel is lacking • [;:>--~~t /1-l.~...-. ~ ..... ~~ 'tf ..M~- "t-d-y 91"~ .. :_ 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
• 
• 
j),b 1 2 December, 1961. 
1 .. Construction Co ... was the general contractor for the constrLlCtion of a dam gn 
property of Red Cedar Works. Hodges was employed by Cons truction Co. as a dump truck 
driver, and his duties were to fill his truck with dirt at a pit three miles from 
the dam site, drive the truck to the site and dl.illlp it, and return for another load. 
The immediate site of the dam was enclosed by a high fence on which "'no trespassing'' 
signs were mounted at intervals of 100 feet. Hodges gained admittance to the dam site 
through a locked gate in the fence, to which gate he had a key. 
543. 
On o~e tr~p to the site and as Hodges was unlocking the gate, Capps, v1ho had no 
connect1on mth the construction, asked Hodges for a ride in the truck to the da:v1 
lts8lf , explaining that he was curious about the type of construction. Hodges ac-
ced~d to this request, and as the truck neared the dam Hodges pointed out to Capps 
vanous parts of the work. While his eyes were thus diverted from the road and as 
~c rounded a sharp curve at 60 miles per hour, Hodges lost ~ontrol of the truck and 
1t left the road, overturned, and Capps was injured . 
. Cap~s consults you and seeks your advice as to the liability, if any, o.f Con-
stn2ct1on Co. to him for the conduct of Hodges. How should you advise him? 
(AGENCY) Construction Co. is not liable. Hodges did not have any authority to allow 
Capps to ride on the truck Restatement Agency, Second § 2h2 reads "A master is not 
subject to liability for the conduct of a servant towards a person banned as the 
result of accepting or soliciting from the servant an invitation, not binding upon 
the master~ to_enter or remain upon the master's premises or vehicle, although the 
conduct winch l.Inmediately causes the hann is within the scope of t)Je ~rvant• s em-
ployment. sr See Illustration 2 and 161 Va. 54r). ~-'L<- --~~ ,IJ.,.L..-~ ;:c_t.~r-;:-~ .--:;; 
' · ,M ,_.,:z:z, t!h-....._ ~ ..-~~ a .t-:i) ~ u.-y.....£) b.~~'"'\ 
)- 2 June 1962. 11~artin ,  a processor o:( meat. in Smithfield, Va., in accordance with a custom of 
long standing, shipped a quantity of tams to KelcAy in Richmond as his factor and 
sales agent. The agreement was that Kelsey should sell the hams, deduct his commiss-
ion, and remit the balance of the purchase money to Martin. Kelsey, as Martin knew, 
had built up a good business in selling Virginia hams and was considered the most 
experienced and best "ham man''~ in the Easto Just before this shipment arrived in 
Richmond, Kelsey lost all his money on the stock market, turned his business over to 
his chief clerk, Dalton, telling him of the expected shipment of hams from Mar·bin, 
inst.rncted him to sell them for the best price he could get, and sailed for South 
Americao Thrifty, to whom Kelsey was J..argely ind3bted, suspe~ted the true facts, 
went to Kelse;l's place of business and found Dalton in charge. Dalt,on confirmed 
Thirrtyes SU3piciona, told him thf?.t the .Hartin hams had been sent to Kelsey to sell 
and then sold tha'll to Thrifty) taking in payme~l'G a note Kelsey owed Thrifty. Martin 
discovered these facts and instituted an d.c-~ion against Thrifty to recover the hams. 
On the above facts, ought Martin to recvver the hams? 
(AGENCY) Yes. Kelsey had no authority to substitute another agent(Dalton) for himseli' 
and hence Dalton had no pmve:t:> . to pass title. Thrifty knew all the facts and was 
acti~g fraudulently when he paid Dalton with the obligations of an insolvent person. 
Even if Dalton was Martin's agent he had nc autho:!'it,y to sell for anything but cash 
or s olvent. credits. Martin act.ed prorapt.ly after dj3covering the f acts. See 11 Howard 
209 ., 
4 f11fller went to Dealer's office and said: "I am in the market for 10,000 bushels 
of wheat, can you supply 'me?" Dealer answered, tti will sell it to you at $2.10 a 
bushel f . oob. cars this place." Miller then said, tt·It is a deal, load the wheat and 
notify me when it is ready to move." Dealer loaded the wheat in railroad cars and 
then called Miller on the telephone and was instructed by him to ship the wheat to 
Superior Grain Coe, freight collect, which he did. At lunch that day Dealer heard 
that Miller was very shaky financially and the next day he heard this rumor repeated. 
Superior Grain Co. was a large milling company of supposedly excellent financial 
standing, so Dealer went to see Miller and asked whether he had bought the wheat 
for himself or for Superior Grain Co., and upon Miller telling him that the purchase 
was really for Superior and that he was acting for it, Dealer said, ••All right, I 
vti.ll just bill them for it, 11 which he did. Superior, although admitting its liabil-
ity, failed to pay and Dealer brought suit and obtained judgment against Superior 
for the full amount due. It then developed that Superior was insolvent and that the 
adverse reports on Miller's credit was untrue. Dealer now consults you as to whether 
he may sue Miller successfully for the purchase price of the wheat. How ought you 
to advise him. 
(AGENCY) Dealer cannot hold Miller. When he prosecuted a suit against the undis-
closed principal to final judgment he made a binding election to look to him only. 
See Restatement of Agency #337. 
2 December 1962. 
1. The Atomic Energy Electric Co. gave a list of delinquent accounts to B, an emplo;\EB 
with instructions to discontinue electric service to the delinquent customers. 
Am<>ng those listed was Carter's Hatchery, then in the process of hatching chickens 
in a large electrically heated incubator. 
B advised the Hatchery of his intention to discontinue the electric service and 
waD told that the Hatchery did not consider delinquent its account with the Electric 
Company. B nevertheless cut the wires leading ~to the hatchery. The incubation 
process interrupted and considerable loss resulted. 
carter's Hatchery brought an action against B and obtained judgment ~a.gainst him 
for $5,000, which he paid. B now consults you as to whether he has any right of 
action against the Electric Company. How shoUld you advise him? 
(AGENCY) I would advise B that he had a right to be indemnified by his employer. 
~He{B) is entitled to assume that acts which the principal directs him to perform 
and which the agent does not know to be and are not obviously unjustified or ' illegal, 
may be performed without incurring loss or legal liability to third pereons, or, at 
leaSt, that if such loss or liability is incurred in carrying out the principal's 
directions, the principal intends to assume the responsibility. The agent is there-
fore entitled to be indemnified by the principal for any liability so incurred ***''· 
Mechem's Outlines of Agency(3rd Ed)#422. 
e.PTf~k Owner operated a fleet of trucks engaged in hauling stone. One of these 
trucks, operated by Driver No.1, ran into the r ear of an aui;omobile operated by 
l'1otorist and occupied by Motorist and his wif e. The operato1·s of both vehicles got 
out of their vehicles but Mrs. Motorist remained seated. An argument ensued between 
Motorist and Driver No. 1 as to who was at fault, and they got into a slight 
scuffle but separated and started to resume their places in t heir respective 
vehicles. Just at this point, another of Truck Owner's vehicles came up, operated by 
Jiriver No.2, who got out and said to Motorist, "Who fights my buddy, fights me. 11 
Heated words follc.wed, and the three men engaged i.n a fight. Mrs. Motorist then got 
out of the car, and, in attempting to separate the combatants, was injured. 
She consults you as to the liability of Truck Owner for her injuries. How ought 
you to advise h~r? . (AGENCY) I lo~ould advise her that Truck Owner was not hable. The Drivers were en-
gaged in a personal argument over something that happened in the past. It is to be 
distinguished from the use of the bus crowding P's car while making a turn, and a 
fight ensued before the turn was completed. See 202 Va.328 on p.614 of the Agency 
Cases of these Notes. 
· -
• 
• 
2 June 1963. 
1; \ZJimes Ash interested several prominent ci t:.zcns of the City of Richmond in for;u.. 
ing and operating a corpo::.·ation to e!lgage in the m-'lnufacture of pre-fabricated 
dv1ellings, the corporation to be knovm as Pre-Fab, I;::c. Before the corporation we:.s 
created, and without the knowledge of its future incorporD.tora, Ash prepared a 
written agreement by the terms of which Tlu·ifty Floors, Inc. agreed to sell to 
Pre-Fab,Inc. 20t000 linear feet of oak fLooring durin8 the year 1964. This agree-
ment was executed on May 1, 1963 by Thrifty Floors, Inc. and by Ash signing 11 on 
behalf of Pre-Fab,Inc. 11 During the mont.h of i"Iay, Thrifty Floors, Inc ~ , relying on 
the a.greement, purchased and stored in its warehouse large quantities of oak floor· 
ing. Oc June 20th, Pre-Fab,Inc., became incorporated and~ at the first meeting of 
its Board of Directors held on th(~ morning of ,Tune 21st, it was moved and seconded 
that the agreement with Thrifty Floors) Ir.c. be ratified. Such motion was unanimous 
ly carried. 
However, having now learned that sui te.ble oak flo oring can be bought at a sub-
stantially lower price from a competitor o.f Thrifty Floors,In-~., Pre-Fab,Inc., 
inquires of you whether it must perform the agreement with Thrifty Floors,Inc. 
Vlhat should you advise? 
(AGENCY) I would advise that it must perfprm the agr eeml'lnt, but not on the theor;y 
of a ratification. The act cannot be ratified becausa ratification relates back,c:L 
at the time the act was done} the purported prin~ipal could not then have author}, 
it. Restatement of Age:ncy(2d) #8L.. However Comment D reads, "Corporate promoter: 
Persons. organizing a corporation may purport to contract for it, and frequently, 
upon organi~ation, the corporation a::>sumes the obJ.igo.tions created in its name. 
~~ ~~ ~< the corp,.)ration does not ratify the promoters 1 contracts by agreeing with 
their terms. The obligation of the corporation car1not have an effective date befo 
the organization becomes a legal entity. H the agreement specifies a prior date 
-:< -l~ i~ the obligation may be the swne as if there were ratification. Such transac :n 
are properly termed adop·cions or Ilovations ." 
In the instant case the Cor porat i on has adopted the original contract. There i 
also authority to sup~ort the a.nal ysis t ).iat there has baen a continuing offer "!<;b •• n 
the Corporati on can accept a::> soon as it cowes into existence. 
D /_, -"J 2 December 1963. 
1. irirgle Vested, a widower, entered into a written contract under seal with Harold 
Huckster, a prominent real estate broker, for the sale of 11Hackney, 11 Vested's plan-
tation overlooking the James River. By the terms of the contract, Huckster was to 
have the exclusive right to sell the property for one year at a price not less than 
$75,000. Huckster was to pay all costs of advertising, etc., and was to receive,as 
his compensation, one-half of the net proceeds of the sale in excess of ~7~_nm. 
' bU~$ 
After, extensive advertis~ment, Huck~ter fomid a ~respective. buyer, Carlton Carpet-
bAg of New Yotk. Before Carpetbag had an opportumty to exa11'!1ne the property, Vest '3<t 
died. A week following Vested's death, Carpetbag 1nade a trip to Virginia and examin-
e~ the property, ~nd Huckster, though knowing of Vested's death, procured Carpetbag: . 
s1gnature to a wr1tten contract of sale, the contract providing that the purchase 
price of $100,000 would be paid in cash upon delivery of a deed. Vested's daughter 
who was his Executrix and his sole devi~ee, refused to sign the contract, stating ' 
that she would not convey the property to Carpetbag. Carpetbag, desiring to acquire 
the property, consults you as to his right to compel Vested's daughter to convey. 
What would you advise? 
(AGENCY) Carpetbag cannot compel Vested's daughter to conveyv Huckster is a real 
estate broker, and even such language as 11exclusive right to sellll does not authorize 
Huckster to complete the contract of sale. E i ~ function is to find a purchaser ready 
willing and able to buy. His principaJ :.. owes no duty to sell the land even though he ' 
would owe a commission. That Huckster understood that Vested, or his successor in 
interest, was to convey, and that he had no such power, is shown by the fact that 
Huckster has not signed any contract of sale, but has left that matter to Carperbag's 
daughter. This is not an agency coupled with an in rem interest in the subject matter 
thereof, so, at common law the death · of Vested would have revoked the agency, but, 
as pointed out above, even if the agency had not been revoked, Carpetbag still could 
not ~:. . :t . specific performance from Vested's daughter. See 3 MoJ. Brokers ##11 et seq. 
Note: If we assume that there was other language clearly giving Huckster the right 
to sell, and that Carpetbag did not know of Vested 1 s death, then under Vl/11-9 .2 
as adopted in 1962 Carpetbag would be entitled to specific performance. 
rt <{- 2 June 1964. 
1. Al Able, trading as AbJ.e Electric Co., operated an electrical contracting and 
sales agency bus i ness with h:Lmself in active overall charge, his son-in-law as 
general manager and salesman and employing f our men a~ rnechanics and maintenance men . 
Able was int.erested in selling a special type of refrigerator to Ben Bella, resta.ura· 
teui'. In an attempt to make t he s a l e it was agreed that Able would install the 
unit on trial to see if it 1-rould give adequa te s ervice during the restaurant's busy • 
periods over the succeeding six we~s, said trial to end August 15th. During this 
six-week period Cal Cruller, one of Able's employee-mechanics and maintenance men 
went to Bella's restaurant on two occasions t o check on the refrigerator unit and 
to make certain minor adjustments. Not having heard anything from Bella in regard 
to the unit, Able sent Bella a bill for the same on October 1. Bella refused to 
pay, saying that he did not ~·1ant the unit as it had proven to be unsatisfactory, 
and Able sued him for the purchase price. 
At the trial Bella testified that he told Cruller when he vms at the restaurant 
the second time, which was two weeks before the trial period ended, that he didn't 
want Cruller to service the unit as he did not want it and i-las not going to buy it 
and that Cruller should give this mes sage to Able8 Cruller testified that he was 
very busy during that period of time and didrt1 t remember any such conversation with 
Bella, although he could not deny the same and he couldnt say whether or not he 
communicated any such mes sa.ge to Ablew Able testified that nothing v1as said t o hi m 
by anyone. 
At the conclusion of the evidence def endant Bella offered an instructi on to the 
ef.f.' ect that if the jury believed that Bella had the related conversation with 
Cruller, then this constituted a suffic ient notifica tion to Able of Bella's intent ion 
not t o pur chase the unit and the jury should find in favor of the defendant. 
Sho~ld the court grant thi s instruction? 
(AGENCY) No. An employee~mechanic is not an agent with authority to deal with hi s 
employer's busi ness matters. Hence notice to him about a matter which is not vntrun 
the scope of his employment is not notice to his principal. See 193 Va.831. 
1', &; rank Dolan retained John East, a re'll e::> ·t a te a gent) t o f i nd f or him a suitable 
lot on which to ersct a s tore bui lding . East s <-::.id: "I knm..; the very lot fo r you, 
# 105 Broad Street _; it is well l ocat ed and r easonably prided, t he owner is anxi ous to 
s ell, and. the trade can be closed for :ip5 ~000 plus my commis sion ." Dolan r eplied: 
nr know the lot and wi l l t ake itn. A wri tten memorandum agr eeing to purchase the 
lot was signed by Dolan, and he gc>.Ye East a ch0<::k f or ~~100 t o use i n binding t he 
bargain. On the dat e se t for closi nr; the t r ansa o: tion, Eas t t ender ed Dolan a dee? 
t o t he lot f r om hi mself and hif: v1.i.fe and. demand ed t he bal anc e of the pur "":hase pr 1ce 
plus his commission. Dola n :refused to ·acc ept U1e daed , ascigning a s his r eas on tha t 
~ntil the t ender of the deed he di dn 1 t know that Eas t was th(~ o1-v:J.er of the lot . 
What a r e the r es pec tive r ignt s of the par t :Les ? 
(AGENCY) Dolan is wi (jhi n his r~_ghts in r efusing tha deed , an1 i s ent itled to the 
r eturn of his ~noo. It wa s tho agent ' s duty as a-f idu.ciaJ~Y to disc lose any and all 
fa<~ts to his pr- i nc ipal of his conf lic t of i ntere:::t in t hi s t~·v.ns~.ction. See 138 Va . 
2L•h. While Dol a n could have r atifie:.l o.nd c onfi. r mE'd f.ast 1 s C~.cts a f ter knowledge of 
the t rue facts he is under no duty t o do s o o 
2 J une 1965. 
1 . A sold goods to B in good f aith , bel iev:i.ng him to be . a princ i pal. B in f act was 
acti ng as a gent of C and vli thin l:.he scope of ? is authon . t y • The good~ were c~arged 
to B and on his r efusal t o pay, he was s ued oy A for t he pur chas e pr1ce. Wln le 
t hi s ' action was pending, A l earned of B1 s r elat ionshi p with Co Nevertheless, 30 
days a f t er l earni ng of tha t relationshi~, A secured j udgment against ~ a nd had.an 
executi on i ssued which was never satis f1 ed. Three months a f t er secunng that JUdg-
ment A sued c for t he pur ehase price of the goods . I s A entit l ed to r ecov e r from c 
(AGE;~CY ) No. When A prosecuted his ~uit to j udgme~t against ~he. a gent , B, with 
knowledge of the f act that B was ac tlng f or a n und1s~losed pr1nc1pal he made a final 
and bi nding electi on to l oolc to B. S ·3 El Rest at€-:ment of Agtmcy 2d, Section 210 a nd 
l M.J. Agency //83 o 
• 
• 
• 
• 
, 2 December 1965. 
1. Ben King owned twent.y acres of tmdeveloped land in Powhatan County from whic:l:. 
the timber h3.d been cut and removed, but on vrhich remained considerable underg~'O:-V0L:• 
The tract was in the center of a heavily wooded area. King wished to clear the 
land and convert it to agricultural use. On October 22, 1965, he entered into a 
contract with Sam Queen, a developer of good reputatio:r.., by the terms of which he 
agreed to pay Queen $500 in consideration of the latter clearing the cut-over land 
and making it suitable for cultivatione The contract provided that the tract be 
promptly cleared, either by burning or by use of bulldozers, but did not reserve ·l:,c 
King any control over the manner in which Queen would perform the. job,. \~/hen the 
contract was made, King cautioned Queen to be careful if he cleared the land by 
burning as the fire might get out of control and damage adjacent property. 
On November 4th Queen went to the property and be~:;an clearing it by burning off 
undergrowth. Because of an extended dry period and brisk winds, the fires got be-
yang the control of ~~een and started a fire on the adjoining property of Peter 
J~ck, destroying a valuable stand of his timber. Jack brought an actton against 
Klng in the Circuit Court of Powhatan County seeking $9.:000 as damage for the loss 
of his timber. On the trial Jack proved the foregoing facts and, when he rested his 
case, King moved the court to strike Jack's evidence on the grounds: 
(a.) That Queen was an independent contractor and not an agent or employee 
of Y.:ing, and 
(b) That any act of carelessness by Queen could not be made chargeable 
to him ~ 
How should the court rule on each ground of Kingws mot ion? 
(AGE~TCY) (a) Yes, Queen is an independent contractor since he has contracted for a 
r esult to be reached in his own way. 
(b) While an employer of an independent contractor is ordinarily not li~ble fo r 
his t orts the:se are well recognized exceptions to that rule, c:.nd the instant case 
comes wi thin the exceptions, one of which is that an employer cannot escape lio.bi l·· 
ity for hazardous undertakings by getting an independent cont ractor to do t hem . 
Here the employer knew that the independent contractor was authorized by him t o use 
fire. King merely asked Queen to be careful. It may very well be that even the 
careful use of fire may be hazardous under the circumstance39 A principal cannot 
escape liability by merely telling his employees to be careful. 
,/ 
2 P ~tom Paul, a cattleman of Hanover County, on Jnne 10, 1965, borrowed $5,000 from 
John Andrews. As a condition of the loan a nd in the presence of Andrew's wif e, 
Paul orally agreed with Andrews that should Paul not repay t he loan on or before 
NO"if o 15, 1965, Andrews was authorized to sell t -v1enty head of the larger herd of 
Paul's registered Black Angus cat t le to r epay Andrews the amount of the loan. On the 
morning of Nov. 16-lih, Paul being i n defa.ult, Andre~-vs took possession of twenty 
head of cattle in the herd for the purpose of s elling them to satisf y the debt. 
On the next day, >>Then hea:dng of Andrer,r' s act ion, Paul became greatly excited and 
telephoned Andrews urgently requesting that he not sell t he cattle but that he 
extend the time for payment . Hhen Andrews refused t he r equest, Paul died from heart 
failure. 
On Nov. 26th, Andrews enter ed i nto a contract with Ed Thomas by vJhich he agr eed 
to sell Thomas the twenty head of cattle at a f air mar ket price of $5,000. At the 
time this contract was made, Thomas knew of the dea·(jh of Paul and that Andre1i7S 1,ras 
relying on the agreement which Paul had earlier made w:i.th him. Before Andreus 
could deliver the cattle to Thomas and receive the agr eed price, the administrator 
of the est at e of Paul br ought agai nst Andrews an action i n detinue alleg7.ng the 
foregoing facts, and praying f or a. judgment r equi ring Andrew3 to deliver back the 
cattle. Was t he administrator entitled to the r elief sought ? 
(AGENCY) No o Af ter Andrews took possession of the cattle as per the pm.;er given 
him, there -vms an agency coupled with an inter est 1>1hich did not t erminate on Paul's 
death. wben Andr e>·lS took possession t he situation is like a compl et ed pledge , and 
the pledgee is t-.'i thin his ri ghts in selling the pledged pr operty even though the 
pledger has died before a sale has been compl eted . The u.c.c . does not r equire a 
writi ng of any sort where the collateral i s in t he possessi on of the creditor. 
3;f~ampton took his automobile to Auto Repair Shop, Inc., for repairs. A mechanic 
employed by that company drove the car out onto the highway for the purpose of 
locating the trouble that its owner had while driving it. Although the m~c·:hanic w.:1.s 
exercising reasonable care in driving the car and making the test, Jim Hnpp negl:!."' 
gently drove his car into the rear of the Hampton automobile with the result that 
it was damaged in the amount of $1200. Auto Repair Shop, Inc., immediately commenced 
an action against Hupp to recover the full amount of the damage sustained by the 
car. Hupp defended on the ground that Hampton alone could maintain an action to 
recover the damage to the car. May Auto Repair Shop,Inc., recover in this action? 
(BAILMENTS) The bailee may maintain an action for the full amount of the damages. 
But, of course, is accountable over to his bailor for the recovery of same. Harris, 
169 va. 647. 
4~~irker wrote a letter to Arthur, with copy to Tate, requesting him to act as his 
agent in purchasing for him a certain unique and valuable painting owned by Tate. 
Parker enclosed with his letter a proposed written contract of sale between Parker 
and Tate, the purchase price and the terms of payment being left blank. Parker 
signed the proposed contract before enclosing it with his letter. The day after 
Arthur and Tate received the letter from Parker, Arthur received a telegram from 
Parker telling him not to purchase the painting and to return the contract to him. 
At the time Parker sent the telegram he addressed and posted a letter to Tate 
advising him that he had decided not to purchase the painting and that he had can-
celled Arthur's authority to act for him. 
Upon receipt of the telegram Arthur immediateJy presented the written contract to 
Tate who signed it after the amount of the purchase price and terms of payment had 
been filled in. Bv the terms of the contract Tate agreed to deliver the painting 
to Parker five days later. A few hours aft~~ Tate signed the contract and delivered 
it to Arthur he received the letter sent to him by Parker, terminating Arthur's 
authority to act for him as his agent. Tate consults you, inquiring whether the con-
tract is binding upon Parker. What would you advise? 
(AGENCY) Principal's revocation of agency ineffective where 3rd party did not receivo 
the notice of revocation before acting on the basis of agent's authorization previcu:>·· 
ly conveyed to him. The agent still has apparent authority to bind principal until 
3rd party receives autual notice. 1 Restatement of Agency 2nd #8. 
AGENCY j) ~ 4-
1. Doz~or employed Elam, a dealer in second-hand auto parts and automobiles, 
to sell Dozier's automobile, and by the employment letter, Dozier specificall:v 
indructod Elam not to make any lrarrantios but to ocll tho automobile 11&}§ il('n 
Foster kncu Elam uas nelling tho automobile for Dozier, and T.rhcn Foster 
expressed interest in tho name, Elam, pursuant to the general cuntom in the 
area but in violation of his instructions, 'trclrrantod that it uas in first-
class condition uith each mechanical part in perfect running order. In 
fact, it had many defe cts uhich could not be discovered by casual inspec-
tion. Foster, relyine on tho uarranty, purchased the automobile and paid 
Elam, nho deducted his commission and foruardod tho balance to Dozier. 
1dithin a Hook, the automobile bocamc inoperative because of its defective 
condition . Foster conoults Lat:yor as to his rights against Dozier. 
vJhat should Lauyer advise? 
Elam had apparent authority to make tho express uarranty. Tho 
lat:yor should advise Foster that he has a cause of action against Dozier 
for broach of tho oxpre.sn uarranty made by Elam. A general agent to sell 
personal property i s prcGUJllCd to ha vo pouor to make such uarranties ui th 
r eference to tho property as arc usual and customary in like sales in that 
locality. \-Jhil c thoro is no customary lau in Vir~inia uhich per so can 
vest a right in a party claiming under it, a unagc or custom of trade may 
be shmm. Furthermore, a restriction upon tho pouer of the agent to make 
the usual uarranties in effecting like sal es , of trhich tho buyer has no 
notice or knoulcdgo , i s not binding on him •. . 94 Va )21. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
lO~~~ck approached Manufacturer, falsely representing himself as being the sales 
manager for Collier, and offered on behalf of Collier to sell and deliver to 
Manufacturer ten tons of coal at $15 per ton. Manufacturer accepted the offer and 
Slick, without Collier's knowledge, went to Collier's storage yard, loaded ten tons 
on his truck and while on the way to Manufacturer's factory, negligently injured 
Pedestrian, but nevertheless delivered the coal to Manufacturer. Collier missed some 
coal and, upon investigation, learned the above facts, but eoal having fallen in 
price he demanded payment of $15 per ton from Manufacturer, who declined to pay. 
I C. ,..Je 
Thereupon, Collier instituted an action against Manufacturer for the p~rpose of 
the coal. Pedestrian, learning of the action, demand~d ~am~ges ~rom Coll1er, who 
now asks your advice as to his liabi]ity for Pedestr1an s 1njur1es. 
How ought you to advise Collier? . f (AGENCY) You should advise Collier that he can be ~eld liabl~ for the injur1es ~ 
edestrian. When Collier instituted his action aga1nst M, thlS acted as.a rat~flc~­
iion of the unauthorized acts of Slick. Under the general restatement v1ew wh1c~ 1s 
t d in Virginia one cannot ratify those portions of an unauthorized activ1ty :~~:h :re beneficial' and reject those which are not beneficial.(Restatement of 
Agency, 2nd, Sec.97, illustration 2). 
)> {; -1 2 December 1967. 1. Falsely purporting to act as Parker's agent, Abernathy makes an executory con-
tract with Tuttle. Parker thereafter affirms it, but does not so advise Tuttle. 
While the contract remains executory and nothing has been done by either party 
toward performance, Tuttle learns the facts and promptly expresses to Parker his 
unwillingness to continue with the transaction. Parker consults you and asks if 
Tuttle is bound on the contract. What should your answer be? 
(AGENCY) Tuttle is bound on the contract. The affirmance by the purported principal) 
like the acc eptance of an offer, is the final act that brings the principal and the 
third person into contractual relations. Tuttle's consent has already been manifest· 
ed to the purported agent. Res t.2d.Par.92 p.237,Ill.l on P• 238 • 
